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Optimal Search for the Best Alternative
Summary
This paper completely characterizes the solution to the problem of
searching for the best outcome from alternative sources with different
properties. The optimal strategy is an elementary reservation price rule,
where the reservation prices are easy to calculate and have an intuitive
economic interpretation.
Introduction
A broad class of economic search problems can be cast in the following
form. There are a number of different opportunities or sources, each
yielding an unknown reward. The uncertainty about the reward from a source
can be eliminated, at a fee, by searching or sampling. Each source has
its own: independent probability distribution for the reward; search
cost; search time. Sources are sampled sequentially, in whatever order
is desired. When it has been decided to stop searching, only one opportunity
is accepted, the maximum sampled reward. Under this formulation, what
sequential search strategy maximizes expected present discounted value?
A powerful solution concept applies to the above model. Each source
is assigned a reservation price -- an invarient critical number analogous
to an internal rate of return. The reservation price of a source is easily
computed, depends only on the features of that source, and has an intuitive
economic interpretation.
The selection rule is to search next that unsampled source with high-
est reservation price. The stopping rule is to terminate search whenever
the maximum sampled reward is above the reservation price of every un-
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sampled source. This simple characterization of an optimal policy is the
basic result of the present paper. Fundamental properties are derived and
interpreted.
An Example
The following example conveys the flavor of the basic problem analyzed
in this paper.
Suppose the research department of a certain large organization
has been assigned the task of finding a new and cheaper way to produce
some commodity. Two substitute technologies are being considered, the
benefits of which are uncertain and would not be known until development
work is completed. Because they produce the same commodity, no more
than one technology would actually be used even if both were developed.
It is estimated that a production process based on the so-called alpha
technology might yield a total savings of 100 with probability .5 and of
55 with probability .5. The alternative omega process with probability .2
might deliver a possible savings of 240 but it would not offer any im-
provement at all with probability .8. R&D, which must be done to remove
the uncertainty, costs 15 for the alpha process and takes one period,
whereas it costs 20 for omega and takes two periods. The interest rate
is 10% per period. Table 1 summarizes the relevant information.
project a 
cost 15 20
duration 1 2
reward 100 55 240 0
probability .5 .5 .2 .8
Table 1
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The problem is to find a sequential search strategy which maximizes
expected present discounted value.
It is easy to show that developing only alpha or only omega is better
than not researching either project. The expected value of researching
alpha is
-15 + (i.l)[.5(100) + .5(55)] = 55.5,
whereas for omega it is
-20 + (1l)2[.2(240) + .8(0)] = 19.7.
Thus, at least one project should be developed.
The next logical question is: which alternative should be researched
first?
By any of the standard economic criteria, alpha dominates omega.
Alpha has lower research cost, shorter development lag, higher expected
reward, greater minimum reward, less variance.
Most economists or engineers might guess that alpha should be developed
first. They would probably be reacting to the fact that the expected
value of alpha is so much higher than omega.
However, there is a crucial difference between the value of a project
and the order in which it should be researched. Alpha is worth more in
the sense that the expected value of an optimal program without it is lower
than without omega. Nevertheless, and somewhat paradoxically, it turns
out that the optimal sequential strategy is to develop omega first.
This can be shown as follows. Suppose alpha is developed first.
If the payoff turns out to be 55, it would then be worthwhile to develop
omega, because the expected value of that strategy would be
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-20 + (1)2[.2(240) + .8(55)] = 56
which is greater than the value at that point of not developing omega,
55. However, since
-20 + {(1 )-2[.2(240) + .8(100)] = 85.8,
it would not be economical to develop omega if alpha had a 100 payoff.
So the expected value of an optimal policy beginning with developing
alpha is
-15 + (- )[.5(100) + .5-20 + (1) 2 [.2(240) + .8(55)]] = 55.9.
A similar calculation shows the expected value of an optimal policy
which starts by developing omega is
-20+ ( )2[.2(240) + .8[-15 + (l)[.5(l00) + .5(55)] = 56.3.
Thus, the optimal policy for this example has the counter-intuitive
property that omega is researched first.
The remainder of thelpaper is devoted to placing this kind of problem
in a more general context, deriving a simple decision rule, and explaining
its properties.
Pandora's Problem1
There are n closed boxes at the beginning of our scenario. Box i,
1 < i < n, contains a potential reward of x with probability distribution
function Fi(xi), independent of the other rewards. It costs c to open
box i and learn its contents, which become known only after a time lag
of ti.. Instantaneous learning is the special case ti = 0.
1 1
1With apologies to connoisseurs of Greek mythology.
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An initial amount x is available, representing a fallback reward
that could always be collected if no sampling were undertaken or if
every sampled reward happened to be less than x. In many applications
it is natural to set x = 0. All costs and benefits are converted to
present values by the discount rate r.
At each stage Pandora must decide whether or not to open a box.
If she chooses to stop searching, Pandora collects at that time the
maximum reward she has thus far uncovered. Should Pandora wish to continue
sampling, she must select the next box to be opened, pay at that time
the fee for opening it, and wait for the outcome. Then will come the
next decision stage. Note a characteristic asymmetry: the sum of search
costs is paid during search, whereas the maximum reward is collected after
search has been terminated.
Pandora worships maximized expected present discounted value. She
needs to know what she should do to be consistent with this fundamental
conviction. Pandora wants a sequential decision rule that will tell her
at each stage whether or not to continue searching, and if so, which box
to open next.
Pandora's problem can be formally posed in dynamic programming format.
Let the collection of n boxes, denoted I, be partitioned into any set S of
sampled boxes and its complement S of closed boxes. That is,
SV S = I, S S = 
where
I = {l,2,...,n}
The variable y will represent the maximum sampled reward (from the
opened boxes and the initial fallback reward)
y = max xi . (1)
ieSu{o}
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It is intuitively obvious (and easily verified) that all relevant
information about the previously opened boxes is summarized by y; knowing
the individual values of x for iSu{o} is superfluous to making a correct
decision because all probability distributions are independent.
The state of the system at any time is given by the statistic (S,y).
Define Y(S,y) as the expected present discounted value of following an
optimal policy from this time on when the set of closed boxes is S and
the maximum sampled reward is y.
For each subset S of I and every y, the state valuation functions 
must satisfy the fundamental recursive relation
T=(S,y) max y, mdax -Ci + c(S-{iy)+ di(i) + (-{i, dFi(xi)J} (2)
-is y
where2
T(q,x) = x (3)
-rt.
f3i =e (4)
Equation (2) is just the principle of optimality for dynamic programming.
At stage (S,y) Pandora could terminate search, collecting reward y. Or,
she might open box i, for each iS, which results in expected discounted
net gain
y 00
-C + (§{iy)f di( i ) + f (S-{i},xi) dFi(xi )
_co Y
The value of an optimal policy at (S,y) is the maximum of these alternatives.
2For some applications it may be appropriate to interpret 1-Bi as
the probability that investigating source i results in a catastrophic
accident, nullifying rewards and terminating search. Note that nothing
formally prevents ci from being negative; in such situations -ci would
be interpreted as a component of gain additive across sources.
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In principle, the state valuation functions {(S,y)} could be recursively
built up by systematic induction on the number of closed boxes. Using
(2), (3), state valuation functions could be constructed first for all
sets consisting of one closed box, then for all sets of two boxes, of three,
four, etc. The actual computation is likely to be a combinatoric task of
unwieldy proportions unless the number of boxes is very small.
At any stage (S,y), Pandora's optimal decision is that policy which
maximizes the right hand side of (2). If two or more policies tie, it makes
no difference how the tie is broken. Note that although an optimal strategy
is implicitly contained in equation (2), the form of that strategy is little
more than a complete enumeration of what to do in all possible situations.
The economic search literature has dealt extensively with the situa-
tion where, in effect, all boxes are identical. For this special case the
issue of choosing which box to open does not arise. The essential question
is when to stop. The answer is: search continues until a reward greater
than some "reservation price" is discovered. The reservation price for
sampling with recall is that hypothetical cutoff value of the maximum
reward which would make it just equal to the expected net gain of opening
exactly one more box.3
The contribution of the present paper is to show that with alternative
search opportunities the optimal policy is a straightforward analogue
of the above idea. Each (different) box is assigned a (different) reserva-
tion price, calculated by the same formula as before, which now serves as a
basis for the optimal stopping and selection rule. The reservation price
of a box determines its ordinal ranking, prescribing when it should be
3This stopping rule is well known and appears in many places. See,
for example, Lippman and McCall [1976] or Landsberger and Peled [1977].
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opened relative to the other boxes. Thus, all the advantages of a simple
rate of return criterion apply in a search context.
Some Interpretations
The formulation presented in this paper is general enough to cover,
at a high level of abstraction, economic search models from a variety
of settings.
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Take for example the standard job search model with wage offers
retained. The current framework allows the situation where the job searcher
may choose to sample from various firms having different characteristics.
The lump sum reward is most appropriately interpreted as the discounted
present value of all future wages. Search costs, which presumably include
a psychic component, are net of any side compensation (unemployment benefits
or wages from a currently held job). The possibility of reaccepting current
work while searching on-the-job is accommodated by making the fallback
reward x equal to the present discounted value of the current wage.
Other modifications are also possible.
Searching for the lowest price on some commodity available from
different stores is also an example amenable to the analysis developed
in this paper. Let the good have some intrinsic utility measured in
dollar terms. The reward available from a store is the difference between
the utility of the commodity and its price. Search costs should include
the opportunity loss of forgoing the item in question while search continues,
as well as the more orthodox cost of visiting a store to obtain a price
quotation. The option of not buying the good at all can be represented by
setting the fallback reward equal to the (dis)utility of henceforth doing
without the item altogether, which can be normalized to zero.
Another area of application concerns the optimal sequential research
strategy for developing various uncertain technologies to meet the same or
a similar purpose. The reward is the potential cost saving of the new
technology, unknown until after it has been developed. Search fees are
research and development expenditures. Search time is the anticipated
length of the R&D process. The option of choosing to continue with the
current known technology is represented by having a zero fallback reward.
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There are several other possible interpretations of the model.
Two of them are described in the section on applications.
The Optimal Strategy
Any closed box is characterized by: a fee for opening it; a time lag
for discovering its contents; a probability distribution for the reward
it contains. Suppose all this information must somehow be compressed into
a single index number, a kind of internal rate of return. One heuristic
procedure would be to evaluate the intrinsic search value of a closed box
by assigning it the hypothetical reward of that opened box to which it
is in some sense equivalent.
Suppose for the moment there are just two boxes. One is the closed
box i. The other is an already opened hypothetical box offering reward
z.. If the searcher elects not to open box i, she receives the "sure1
thing"
z.i (5)1
If she opens box i, the searcher can expect a net benefit
Zi .
-ci + i Zi I dFi(xi) + x i dFi(i) (6)
Zi
The closed and opened boxes are heuristically "equivalent" if the
searcher is just indifferent between opening box i and not opening it.
This will occur if (5) and (6) are equal to each other, a condition which
can be rewritten
o00
ci = , f (xi-zi) dFi(xi) - (l-Si)zi (7)
Zi1
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The critical number z. which satisfies (7) is called the reservation1
price of box i.
Although the definition (7) has been motivated by heuristic considera-
tions, it turns out there is a rigorous sense in which all relevant informa-
tion about box i is summarized by its reservation price z.
The following decision strategy, called Pandora's Rule, completely
characterizes an optimal policy.
Selection Rule: If a box is to be opened, it should be that
closed box with highest reservation price.
Stopping Rule: Terminate search whenever the maximum sampled
reward exceeds the reservation price of every closed box.
What is remarkable about this rule is that the entire structure of
an optimal policy has been reduced to a simple statement about reservation
prices. Furthermore, the reservation price of each box is calculated by
equating a hypothetical gain of stopping (5) not with the full gain of
opening the box and continuing on in an optimal manner, but rather with
the myopic gain of opening the box and terminating (6). In other words,
the reservation price of a box depends only on the properties of that
box and is independent of all other search opportunities.
Note that if Pandora samples from n identical boxes, the optimal
policy is to continue search until she uncovers a reward greater than
the common reservation price of each box. In this special case, it is
comparatively simple to prove optimality.
The proof of Pandora's rule, which is quite technical, is relegated
to the final section.
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Properties of Reservation Prices
From (7), the reservation price of a box is completely insensitive
to the probability distribution of rewards at the lower end of the tail.
Any rearrangement of the probability mass located below zi leaves zi
unaltered. It is important to understand this feature. Considering that
a box could be opened at any time, the only rationale for opening it
now is the possibility of terminating further search by drawing a relatively
high reward. That is why the lower end of its reward distribution is
irrelevant to the order in which box i should be sampled even though it
may well influence the value of an optimal policy by altering the likelihood
that x.i will end up being the largest reward drawn.
On the other hand, as rewards become more dispersed at the upper
end of the distribution, the reservation price increases and so does the
net benefit of search. Other things being equal, it is optimal to sample
first from distributions which are more spread out or riskier in hopes
of striking it rich early and ending the search. This is a major result
of the present paper. Low-probability high-payoff situations should
be prime candidates for early investigation even though they may have
a smaller chance of ending up as the source ultimately yielding the maximum
reward when search ends.
The standard comparative statics exercises performed on (7) yield
anticipated results. Reservation price decreases with: greater search
cost, increased search time, or a higher interest rate. Moving the prob-
ability mass of rewards to the right (i.e., changing the distribution
function Fi(xi) to Gi(xi) < Fi(xi)) makes z.i larger. Thus, although
there is no necessary connection between the mean reward and the reserva-
tion price, there is a well-defined sense in which higher rewards increase
the reservation price. Similarly, performing a mean preserving spread
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on the distribution function Fi(xi) makes Zi bigger. In this sense a
riskier distribution of rewards implies a higher reservation price.4
Note that acceptance levels decline with the duration of search, as
the best opportunities are sampled first and the poorer ones later.
Because it is so easy to calculate reservation prices, sensitivity
analysis is made especially simple. The effect on project ranking (and
hence on an optimal policy) of changing such parameters as search costs,
the probability distribution of rewards, search time, or the interest rate
is easily determined. It is also easy to say how an optimal search strategy
changes when certain opportunities are added to or deleted from the list of
prospective candidates.
Applications
To illustrate the nature of the solution concept and indicate what it
depends on, two explicit examples are calculated for interesting special
cases.
In the first example, suppose that box i contains one of two outcomes:
either zero reward ("failure") with probability 1-pi, or positive reward Ri
("success") with probability Pi. To keep things simple there is no dis-
counting (Bi = 1) and the expected net gain piRi - ci is positive.
Applying (7) to this special case yields the closed form expression
Pii i
z = (8)
1 P.
The reservation price of a box is the expected net gain divided by
the probability of success. For the same expected net gain, that box
is opened first which offers a smaller probability of success.
4This feature has been analyzed by Kohn and Shavell [1974] for
the case of identical boxes.
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After ranking boxes to be opened in order of decreasing zi, the
searcher moves down the list until a success is encountered. At that
point search ends because R. > z..
Suppose, as a further restriction, search is for the same object,
for example a new product with certain well-defined characteristics. Then
all rewards R are identical. In that case (8) reduces to
C.
Z = R--- .
1 Pi
The next opportunity sampled is the one offering the highest probability of
success per dollar of search cost. This is also a well-known characteriza-
tion of the best way to locate a lost or hidden object.5
A second example is the so-called "gold mining problem".6 Suppose
there is a movable gold mining machine. Mine i contains amount G. of
gold, but after digging it out the machine is liable to break down with
probability qi, preventing all further mining. In what order should the
mines be exploited to maximize total expected gold?
Problems like this are a special (almost degenerate) case of Pandora's
problem. Equation (2) is a valid dynamic programming formulation of
the gold mining problem under the special assumptions x = 0, xi = 0
(each box contains zero reward with probability one), ci = -Gi, i = l-qi.
Applying (7) to this special case, the integral vanishes when z.i > 0,
yielding as a solution the closed form expression
5See, for example, De Groot 11970], Kadane and Simon 1977], or
Stone [1975].
6There are several variants of this problem, having essentially
the same underlying structure. Other names are the quiz show problem,
the obstacle course problem, the least cost testing sequence problem.
See, for example, Bellman [1957], or Kadane [1969]. With only minor
changes in interpretation, the present framework can incorporate such
features as possible breakdown before receiving the prize, waiting times,
consolation prizes, etc.
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G.1
z = -= 
qi
The optimal policy is to exploit next that unopened mine with maximum
gold per probability of machine breakdown, a classic result.
Some Limitations
The purpose of the model formulated in this paper is to sharply
characterize optimal search among alternative sources with different
characteristics. Naturally certain "other" aspects of the optimal search
problem have been abstracted away.
Many of the underlying assumptions of the present formulation are
unrealistic. There has been no provision made for: adaptive learning
about correlated probability distributions; pay-as-you-go research (with
the possibility of backing out of a project if prospects start looking
unfavorable); parallel search activity; risk aversion; incomplete or no
recall; collecting some reward before search is terminated; randomly generated
new opportunities; a binding time horizon; uncertain search costs or search
time; etc.7 Yet the model as a whole captures enough essential aspects
of reality that it should be useful in providing project rankings which
might serve as a rough planning guide of sorts, a kind of pre-investment
screening device, or a reference point for the numerical analysis of a
more comprehensive dynamic programming type formulation.
The fact that it is possible to explicitly construct an optimal solu-
tion makes the problem analyzed here a natural preliminary to more general
formulations. And the present model may even be a reasonable description
of some situations.
7Some of these topics have been treated in the literature, most
typically for the symmetric case where all boxes are identical. See the
bibliography cited at the end of this paper.
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That such an elementary decision strategy as Pandora's rule is optimal
depends more crucially than might be supposed on the simplifying assumptions
of the model. There does not seem to be available a sharp characterization
of an optimal solution when certain features of the present model are
changed. Pandora's rule does not readily generalize.
For example, Pandora's rule does not determine an optimal ordering
if she may only open m of the n boxes available to her. An example of this
was provided in the second section, where alpha was preferable when only
one opportunity could be searched, whereas omega was the better starting
choice with the possibility of sequential sampling from both sources. In
the general case n > m > 2, an involved permutational exercise would be
required to determine which m boxes should be potentially sampled.
However, once given the list of m boxes, Pandora's rule applied to this
subset would be the optimal decision strategy.
If reward distributions were not independent, the optimal search
strategy could be very complicated. When a box is opened, the searcher
would learn not only about its contents, but also about the reward dis-
tributions of alternative boxes.8 It appears plausible that other things
being equal it would be better to open a box whose reward is highly correlated
with other rewards because this adds a positive informational externality.
But translating such an effect into a simple search rule seems difficult
except in the most elementary cases.
Parallel search efforts and pay-as-you-go research with the option
of backing out are important features of the R&D scene omitted from the
current formulation. They seem to be very hard to model well.9 Perhaps
8Rothschild [1974] contains an illuminating analysis of adaptive
search policies for the case of identical boxes.
9See, for example, Marshak et al. [1967].
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it is wishful thinking, but my feeling is that the results of this paper
might still constitute a useful guide here. Even though modified by more
complicated and realistic considerations, something like Pandora's rule
should remain part of any optimal sequential search policy.
If some fraction of its reward can be collected from a research proj-
ect before the sequential search procedure as a whole is terminated, that
could negate Pandora's rule in extreme cases. It might be optimal to start
off with a cheap low-risk research project which promises to supply modest
benefits throughout the period of sequential search for the best alterna-
tive. Such a project is unlikely to be chosen at the end of the search,
but it is developed at the beginning because it can provide a stream of
interim rewards while the results of further sampling are awaited.
The cases of sampling without recall, risk aversion, and randomly
generated new opportunities have been treated to some extent in the
10
literature. An optimal policy is typically complicated, especially when
there are different kinds of boxes. What to do next will depend in an
intricate way on past results and future possibilities.
A binding time horizon is somewhat like a restriction on the number
of boxes that can be opened. To some extent the intended effect may be
captured by naming an appropriately high discount rate. As in the case
of a curved utility function, an optimal policy will move toward sampling
less risky distributions.
If search costs or discount factors are randomly distributed inde-
pendently of everything else, no changes in formulation are necessary so
long as ci and Hi are interpreted as mean values.
1 0See especially Salop 11973] who treats thoroughly the no recall
case. The other two cases are briefly surveyed for a situation with
identical boxes in Lippman and McCall [1976].
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Proof of Optimality
First it must be shown that the formula for determining the reservation
price of a box is well defined.
Let
00
Hi(z) = i (xi-z) dFi( i ) - (1-i )z (9)z
It is easily verified that the function Hi(z) is continuous and monotonic.
By taking the appropriate limits, H(-oo) = A, Hi(O) = -a (=O if i=l). Thus,
so long as c > 0 or S i < 1, there exists a solution z. to the equation
Ci Hi(zi)
which is unique.
The proof of the main proposition is by induction on the number of
closed boxes. Suppose Pandora's rule is optimal with m closed boxes re-
maining and any value of y (representing the maximum return from the pre-
viously opened boxes and the initial fallback reward). For m = 1, the
optimality of Pandora's rule is easily demonstrated just by-directly
applying the definition of reservation price.
Henceforth we will be considering a situation with m+l closed boxes
(the set S) and any value of y.
Let j be a box with biggest reservation price in the collection of
m+l closed boxes
-17-
j max z (10)
z = max z. . (10)J i-1
If y > z, it is simple to demonstrate the optimality of not opening
any boxes. (After one box is opened, by Pandora's rule applied to m closed
boxes it will be optimal to stop. Hence the question is whether opening
exactly one box is better than not opening any, which is easily answered
in the negative.) The stopping criterion of Pandora's rule is thus proved
for m+l closed boxes.
If y < z, it is straightforward to show the nonoptimality of no further
search. (Just opening box j and then stopping would yield a higher expected
present discounted value.) Thus, at least one box should be opened.
Suppose (by contradiction with Pandora's rule) it is optimal to open
box k first, where k is any box in S having a lower reservation price
than j
kcS
zk < z.. (11)
Zk (J
If box k is opened first, by the induction assumption on Pandora's
rule for m closed boxes there is an exact prescription of what to do in
an optimal policy thereafter. Let the expected discounted present value
of opening box k and following Pandora's rule thereafter, which is alleged
to constitute the best strategy, be B.
Consider the following alternative. Open box j first. Let h be a
box with second biggest reservation price in the collection of m+l closed
boxes
hS-{j }
z = max z. . (12)
h i-{j) 1
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If xj > Zh' terminate. Otherwise, open box k next. From then on proceed
by Pandora's rule. Let the expected present discounted value of this
alternative policy be A.
The rest of the proof, although technical in its details, essentially
consists of showing that A > B. From this it follows that the originally
proposed policy of first opening box k cannot in fact be best. It must be
optimal to first open the box with biggest implicit worth in S and then,
from the induction assumption, to proceed by Pandora's rule for the remaining
m closed boxes. But this is just Pandora's selection rule for m+l closed
boxes, completing the induction step.
The following notation is employed (Figure 1 may be useful in providing
a sort of mnemonic device).
fj = prob(xj>zj) wj = E[xj Ixj>zj]
Wk = prob(xk>Zj) Wk = E[Xklxk>Zj]
= prob(zh<xj<z) vj = E[xjzh<Xj<zJ] h- = E[max(xj,y)zh<xj<Zj]
k = prb(Zh<xk<zj) vk = Emklah<xk<zx(] k = Ema(xk)h<k<j]
Ik = prob(zk <xk<Zh) uk = Exklzk<xk<zh]
variable: Xk xj xk x. xk
probability: Ik Ij Xk ; k
value(s): uk v. vk w; wk
J J
v vk
Zk Zh Zj
Figure 1
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d = E[max(xj,xk,Yy)I zh<x j<z; ZhXk<zj] (13)
= E[T(S-{j}-{k},max(xj,xk,y)) Ixj<zh; Xk<zh] (14)
The expected present discounted value of opening box k and then pro-
ceeding by Pandora's rule is
B = -ck + kkWk + Xkk[-C j+ j + X d + (l-j-j) v k ]
+ (1-7k-Xk)k-Cj + jBjj + jYjj] + (l-7k-Xk)(l-j--j)kBj) . (15)
The proposed alternative is: open box j; if x > Zh terminate;
if xj < zh, next open box k and then proceed by Pandora's rule. The ex-
pected present discounted value of such a policy is
A = -j + j.jw + Xjfjvj + (l-T.-Xj) j[-ck + kkWk + XkBkvk]
+ (1-Tj-kj) (l-.fk-lk)Bj i kD (16)
Subtracting (15) from (16), cancelling some terms and grouping others,
A - B = Ic -rjBjwj)((1-rk) k - 1) + (Ck-7kBkWk)(l - (1-ij- j)Bj)
+ Ajjj - Xk kXjjd - (l-rk-Xk)kijBji . (17)
From (7),
cj = jrj(wj-zj) - (1-j)zj , (18)
Ck = k[fk(Wk-Zk) + Xk(Vk-zk) + k(Uk-Zk)] - (1-k)Zk . (19)
Substituting in (17) for cj and ck from the above expressions yields
something that can be manipulated into the form
A -B = (zj-zk) (jSi+l-ji) (kSk+l-k)] + (VkZk)[kk(1-j+j j) 
+ (j-Z k) [Bjij (1-Bk+ k k)] + (UkZk) [Pkok(1- j+jj+j j) i
+ (j+Vvk-zk-d) [AkBkXjSj] I (20)
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From the definition (13),
d = Zh + Emax(max(xj ,y)-zh,xk
-
zh)Izh< X j<z j;zh<Xk<j
< zh + E(max(xj ,Y)-zh+Xk-zh)/Zh<-X< zj ;Zh-Xk<Zj
= vj + vk - Zh
< vj + vk - Zk · (21)
Using the above inequality and the fact that O<j <l, O<Sk<l, every
term of expression (20) is seen to be non-negative, with the first term
strictly positive. Thus,
A > B . (22)
This concludes our proof of the form of an optimal policy.
Strictly speaking, we have proved the necessity of Pandora's rule.
That rule specifies a unique strategy for each state (except when there
is a tie for the maximum reservation price of a closed box, in which case
it can be shown, along the lines of the current proof, that how the tie
is broken makes no difference to the value of the objective function).
Thus, since an optimum policy exists, sufficiency of Pandora's rule has
also been demonstrated.
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